Plato's Crito and Phaedo: A Glossary

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A. How to use this

The entries fall into four groups: the people in and around the two dialogues; places, rites and institutions; the ideas and arguments; and the myth of the true earth that closes the Phaedo. Each group runs alphabetically. Greek words are given in plain transliteration only where the Greek term does work that the English hides.

References are to Stephanus pages, the numbers and letters printed in the margin of every modern edition (Phaedo 64c means page 64, section c). "Cr." is the Crito (43a-54e) and "Ph." the Phaedo (57a-118a). Entries flagged **Watch** mark a word that shifts meaning inside the dialogue, or that means something different from its modern English cousin; those are the places a discussion tends to talk past itself.

For the sections the organizer has marked in the Phaedo, these are the entries that carry the weight:

Ph. 59c-69e (the prison scene and Socrates' defense). Apollodorus, Xanthippe, the Eleven, Evenus, Philolaus, Aesop, suicide prohibition, death as separation, the body as obstacle, practice for dying, purification, true and slavish virtue, the mysteries, Forms.

Ph. 72e-84b (recollection and affinity). Recollection, the Equal itself, "what it is", the cyclical argument (which recollection is joined to at 77c-d), the affinity argument, Hades, reincarnation, popular virtue, Penelope's web.

Ph. 89b-91c (the warning against hating argument). Misology, the Argives' oath, Heracles and Iolaus, the Euripus, the bee's sting.

Ph. 96a-102a (Socrates' intellectual autobiography). Natural science, Anaxagoras, Mind, cause (including the bones and sinews), the second sailing, hypothesis, the safe answer, participation.

Ph. 107c-end (the myth and the death). Care of the soul, the guardian spirit, the true earth, the hollows, Tartarus, the four rivers, the noble risk, the bath, hemlock, the jailer and the executioner, Asclepius and the cock.

B. People

Aeschines. An Athenian follower of Socrates, present at the death (Ph. 59b), who later wrote Socratic dialogues of his own that survive only in fragments.

Aesop. The legendary author of animal fables. Socrates muses that Aesop would have made a fable of pleasure and pain as two creatures joined at the head (Ph. 60b-c), and in prison he has been setting Aesop's fables to verse (Ph. 60d, 61b).

Anaxagoras. A natural philosopher from Clazomenae who lived for years in Athens in the fifth century BC. He appears twice: once for his claim that originally "all things were mixed together" (Ph. 72c), and at length in Socrates' autobiography, where his doctrine that Mind (nous) orders everything first thrills Socrates and then disappoints him, because the books explain things by air, ether and water rather than by what is best (Ph. 97b-99c).

Antisthenes. An Athenian follower of Socrates present at the death (Ph. 59b), later remembered as a forerunner of the Cynics.

Apollodorus. The most emotional of Socrates' companions. Phaedo singles him out as overcome from the start (Ph. 59a-b), and his loud weeping after the poison sets the whole room off (Ph. 117d).

Aristippus and Cleombrotus. Two followers of Socrates who were absent, reportedly in Aegina, an island a short sail from Athens (Ph. 59c). Readers since antiquity have wondered whether Phaedo's tone is a rebuke.

Cebes. A young man from Thebes, a companion of Simmias, who had heard the Pythagorean Philolaus. He is the most persistent questioner in the Phaedo: he presses the puzzle about suicide (Ph. 62c-e), raises the fear that the soul disperses "like breath or smoke" (Ph. 70a), and offers the weaver objection (Ph. 86e-88b) that drives Socrates to his final argument. Simmias says he is the hardest man alive to persuade (Ph. 77a). In the Crito he is named among those ready to pay for an escape (Cr. 45b).

Crito. An old friend of Socrates, his age-mate from the same deme, and a man of means. In the Crito he arrives before dawn with the news of the ship and a

fully planned escape (Cr. 43a-46a); in the Phaedo he has charge of practical matters, relays the executioner's warning (Ph. 63d-e), asks about burial (Ph. 115c), tries to delay the cup (Ph. 116e), and closes Socrates' eyes (Ph. 118a). His son Critobulus is also present (Ph. 59b).

Ctesippus, Menexenus, Hermogenes, Epigenes. Athenians named among those present (Ph. 59b). Several turn up as characters in other Platonic dialogues.

Echecrates. A Pythagorean of Phlius, in the northern Peloponnese, to whom Phaedo tells the whole story (Ph. 57a). He interrupts twice: to confess that the theory of the soul as an attunement has always gripped him (Ph. 88c-e) and to applaud the method of hypothesis (Ph. 102a). He stands in for the reader who hears the arguments at second hand.

Euclides and Terpsion. Followers of Socrates from Megara, present at the death (Ph. 59c). Euclides founded a school of philosophy in Megara.

Evenus. A poet and teacher from Paros. Socrates' message to him, that a sensible man should "follow me as soon as possible" (Ph. 61b), opens the discussion of whether a philosopher should welcome death, and whether he may hasten it.

Heracles and Iolaus. The hero Heracles and his nephew and helper Iolaus. When Phaedo protests that even Heracles could not fight two opponents at once (Simmias and Cebes), Socrates offers to be his Iolaus; Phaedo answers that it will be the other way round, Iolaus calling on Heracles (Ph. 89c).

Homer. The epic poet, quoted throughout: Achilles' line about reaching Phthia on the third day lies behind Socrates' dream (Cr. 44b), Odysseus rebuking his own heart is the counterexample to the attunement theory (Ph. 94d-e), and Homer's "deepest pit below the earth" is Tartarus (Ph. 112a).

Penelope. Odysseus' wife in the Odyssey, who wove a shroud by day and unpicked it by night. A soul that philosophy has begun to free, but that hands itself back to pleasure and pain, labors like Penelope at an endless web (Ph. 84a).

Phaedo. A young man from Elis, a devoted follower of Socrates, who narrates the dialogue that bears his name. He was there, sitting on a low stool by the bed (Ph. 89b), and his long hair gives Socrates the occasion for the vow against misology (Ph. 89b-c).

Philolaus. A Pythagorean philosopher who taught for a time in Thebes, where Simmias and Cebes heard him (Ph. 61d-e). The doctrine that we must not kill ourselves is traced to him, though, as Cebes complains, he never gave a clear reason.

Plato. The author. He has Phaedo say "Plato, I believe, was ill" (Ph. 59b). Plato names himself only here and in the Apology, and this mention marks the account as reported, not witnessed.

Simmias. A Theban, Cebes' companion, also a hearer of Philolaus. He offers money for the escape (Cr. 45b), carries much of the early Phaedo as Socrates' respondent, and raises the objection that the soul is an attunement of the body (Ph. 85e-86d). Even after the final argument he admits to lingering private doubt (Ph. 107a-b), which Socrates endorses.

Socrates. The Athenian philosopher, aged about seventy (Cr. 52e), tried and condemned in 399 BC for impiety and corrupting the young. He wrote nothing; both dialogues present him as Plato chose to. In the Crito he refuses escape; in the Phaedo he spends his last day arguing that the soul is immortal and dies by the poison at sunset.

The jailer and the executioner. Several functionaries appear. The warder lets Crito in early because he has been tipped (Cr. 43a). A gatekeeper keeps the friends waiting while the Eleven unchain Socrates (Ph. 59e). The officer of the Eleven, who announces that it is time, weeps and is praised by Socrates as a gentle man (Ph. 116b-d). A separate man prepares and administers the poison and tells Socrates how to take it (Ph. 63d-e, 117a-118a).

Xanthippe. Socrates' wife. She is sitting by him with their baby when the friends arrive, cries out that this is the last conversation, and is taken home by Crito's people (Ph. 60a). Socrates has three sons, two small and one older (Ph. 116b); the Crito's argument about his duty to them turns on this (Cr. 45c-d, 54a-b).

C. Places, rites and institutions

Argives' oath. The people of Argos, after losing a border town to Sparta, swore not to grow their hair until they won it back. Socrates says that if the argument dies, he and Phaedo should cut their hair in mourning for it, and swear like the Argives not to let it grow until they have beaten Simmias and Cebes (Ph. 89b-c).

Asclepius and the cock. Asclepius was the god of healing; the sick who slept in his shrines offered him a cockerel on recovery. Socrates' last words ask Crito to pay a cock owed to Asclepius (Ph. 118a). The usual reading is that death is the cure for the illness of embodied life, which fits Ph. 66b-67b, but the line has also been read as thanks for the friends' recovery from misology, or simply as a piety kept to the end. **Watch:** the dialogue gives no gloss; any reading is ours.

Bath. Socrates bathes before drinking the poison "to save the women the trouble of washing the corpse" (Ph. 115a), a final act that treats the body as a thing to be disposed of tidily.

Corybants. Ecstatic worshippers whose rites involved frenzied dancing to flute music that filled the ears. Socrates says the speech of the Laws rings in him like that music, so that he can hear nothing else (Cr. 54d).

Crete and Sparta. Cities whose laws Socrates is said to have admired (Cr. 52e); the Laws point out he never moved to either.

Delos and the sacred ship. Athens sent a ship each year on a religious mission (theoria) to Apollo's island of Delos, commemorating Theseus' rescue of the youths sent to the Minotaur. While the ship was away the city had to stay ritually pure, so no executions took place (Ph. 58a-c). The ship sailed the day before the trial, which is why Socrates sat in prison about a month; its sighting off Sunium sets the date of the Crito (Cr. 43c-d).

Dream of the woman in white. Socrates dreams that a woman tells him he will reach "fertile Phthia" on the third day (Cr. 44a-b), quoting Achilles' talk of sailing home. He reads it as the day of his death, and counts the days the Greek way, inclusively.

Dreams about music. A recurring dream told Socrates to "practice and cultivate the arts" (mousike, the arts of the Muses). He had taken it to mean philosophy, the highest of them; in prison he hedged by writing a hymn to Apollo and versifying Aesop (Ph. 60e-61b).

Elis. Phaedo's home city in the western Peloponnese.

Euripus. The narrow strait between the island of Euboea and the mainland, notorious for currents that reverse direction several times a day. It is Socrates' image for the world as the misologist sees it, with nothing stable in things or arguments (Ph. 90c).

Exile and the alternatives. At his trial Socrates could have proposed exile as his penalty and declined (Cr. 52c). The Laws picture what flight would bring: suspicion in well-governed Thebes or Megara, or a disreputable life in lawless Thessaly, where Crito has friends (Cr. 45c, 53b-e).

Hades. The underworld, and the god who rules it. Socrates plays on a popular etymology linking Hades with aides, "the unseen" (Ph. 80d, 81c), so the soul's journey to Hades is a journey to the invisible realm it is akin to. The Laws also speak of their "brothers, the laws of the underworld" (Cr. 54c).

Hemlock. The dialogue never names the plant; it says only "the poison" (pharmakon, a word that also means drug or medicine). Athens executed citizens with a potion conventionally identified as poison hemlock. Plato's account of a calm, numbness rising from the feet (Ph. 117e-118a) is gentler than the plant's known effects, a fact much discussed.

Libation. A small offering of drink poured to the gods. Socrates asks whether he may pour one from the cup and is told only enough has been mixed (Ph. 117b); he prays instead.

Megara and Thebes. Neighbouring cities, both called well governed (Cr. 53b), and the homes of several of those present: Euclides and Terpsion from Megara, Simmias and Cebes from Thebes. Socrates jokes that his bones and sinews would long ago be in Megara or Boeotia if bodily causes ran his life (Ph. 99a).

Mysteries. Secret initiation cults, such as those at Eleusis or of Dionysus, that promised the initiated a better lot after death. Socrates borrows their language repeatedly: the body as a guard-post or prison (Ph. 62b), the uninitiated lying "in the mire" in Hades (Ph. 69c), and the saying that many carry the thyrsus, the Bacchic wand, but few are true Bacchants, which he applies to real philosophers (Ph. 69c-d).

Phlius. A small city in the northern Peloponnese, home of Echecrates and of a Pythagorean community, where Phaedo stops on his way home and tells his story (Ph. 57a).

Pythagoreans. Followers of Pythagoras, a sixth-century sage, whose communities held that the soul is immortal and passes through many lives, and that one must keep it pure. Philolaus, Echecrates, Simmias and Cebes are connected with them, and much of the Phaedo's imagery of purification and reincarnation draws on their circles.

The Eleven. The Athenian board in charge of the prison and of executions. Their men unchain Socrates on the last morning and tell him how the day will go (Ph. 59e), and their officer gives the final summons (Ph. 116b-c).

The trial. Socrates was tried before a large citizen jury in 399 BC. Both dialogues treat it as the backdrop: the Laws distinguish the injustice done by men from the laws themselves (Cr. 54c), and in the Phaedo Socrates calls his argument a second defense speech, hoping to persuade his friends better than he did the jury (Ph. 63b, 69d-e).

D. Ideas and arguments

Affinity argument. The third argument for immortality (Ph. 78b-84b). Things are of two kinds: the invisible, unchanging and uncompounded, which cannot be scat-

tered, and the visible, changing and composite, which can. The soul is more like the first, the body like the second; the soul also rules the body as the divine rules the mortal (Ph. 80a). So the soul is likely to be indissoluble, or nearly so (Ph. 80b). Socrates claims only likeness and likelihood, which is why Simmias and Cebes can still object.

Arete (virtue). Excellence of any kind, and of character in particular: courage, moderation, justice, wisdom. See **True virtue and slavish virtue** and **Popular virtue**. **Watch:** Greek virtue is not chiefly about rule-keeping; it is being good at being human.

Attunement objection (harmonia). Simmias' objection (Ph. 85e-86d). A tuning of a lyre is invisible and in a sense divine, yet it ceases the moment the lyre breaks. If the soul is the right blend or tuning of the body's hot, cold, wet and dry, it would perish first, not last. Socrates answers with three points (Ph. 91e-95a): it clashes with recollection, which Simmias accepts, since a tuning cannot exist before its instrument; a tuning comes in degrees, but one soul is not more a soul than another, and the virtue of a soul cannot be a tuning of a tuning; and a tuning follows its strings, whereas the soul often opposes and commands the body. **Watch:** harmonia means the fitting-together or tuning of an instrument, not harmony in the modern sense of chords sounding together.

Bee's sting. Socrates asks his friends to resist him if he is wrong, so that he does not, "like a bee," leave his sting in them when he goes (Ph. 91c): a warning against being persuaded by affection rather than argument.

Body as obstacle. The senses mislead, the body's needs and diseases distract, and its desires cause wars over wealth; so the soul thinks best when it is most by itself (Ph. 65a-67b). An imagined speech of true philosophers to one another draws the conclusion that pure knowledge comes, if ever, after death (Ph. 66b-67b).

Care of the soul. The practical conclusion Socrates draws once the soul is shown immortal: if death ended everything it would be a windfall for the wicked, but since the soul goes on carrying nothing but its education and upbringing, it needs care for all time, not just for a lifetime (Ph. 107c-d). His last instruction to his friends is the same: look after yourselves (Ph. 115b).

Cause (aitia). The reason why, or what is responsible for, something being as it is. Socrates wanted the causes of coming to be, perishing and existing (Ph. 96a). He separates the real cause from "that without which the cause would not be able to act" (Ph. 99b): his bones and sinews are a necessary condition of his sitting in prison; the cause is his judgment that staying is best. **Watch:** aitia is broader than the modern "cause" as an earlier event that produces a later one; it covers explanations by purpose and by Form.

Composite and incomposite. What is put together can be taken apart; what is uncompounded, if anything, cannot (Ph. 78c). The distinction powers the affinity argument and returns in Simmias' attunement objection, since a tuning is composite.

Courage and moderation (andreia, sophrosune). Two of the main virtues. Socrates says ordinary people are brave out of fear of worse things and moderate out of a desire for other pleasures, so that their virtue is a trade of feelings (Ph. 68d-69a).

Cyclical argument (argument from opposites). The first argument for immortality (Ph. 70c-72e). Whatever has an opposite comes to be from it: the larger from the smaller, waking from sleeping. Being alive and being dead are opposites, and the passage from living to dead must be balanced by a passage back, or everything would end up dead, as everything would sleep forever like Endymion (Ph. 72b-c). So the souls of the dead exist somewhere and return. Socrates later joins it to recollection to cover existence both before birth and after death (Ph. 77c-d).

Death as separation. Socrates' working definition: death is the soul's coming to be by itself, apart from the body, and the body's apart from the soul (Ph. 64c, 67d). Everything in the defense turns on it.

Deathless and indestructible (athanatos, anolethros). The final argument first shows the soul is deathless, unable to admit death; it then needs a further step, that what is deathless is also indestructible, and secures it by appeal to general agreement that the god and the Form of life never perish (Ph. 105e-107a). **Watch:** the gap between "cannot be dead" and "cannot be destroyed" is where many readers locate the argument's weakest joint.

Equal itself. Socrates' chief example in the recollection argument. Equal sticks and stones can seem equal to one person and unequal to another, but the Equal itself never seems unequal (Ph. 74b-c). Since we judge equal things to fall short of it, we must have known it before we first saw them (Ph. 74d-75c).

Final argument. The fourth and last argument (Ph. 102a-107a). Opposites, whether the Forms themselves or the tallness "in us," never admit their opposites: when the opposite approaches, they withdraw or perish (Ph. 102d-103a). Some things that are not themselves opposites always bring an opposite with them: three always brings oddness and so will not admit the even; fire brings

heat and will not admit cold (Ph. 103c-105b). Soul always brings life to whatever it occupies, so it will not admit death, which makes it deathless (Ph. 105c-e), and, given one more premise, indestructible. See **Deathless and indestructible**.

Forms (eidos, idea). The unchanging realities that thought, not sense, grasps: the Just itself, the Beautiful, the Good, the Equal, Bigness, Health (Ph. 65d-e, 74a, 100b). Each is "itself by itself" (auto kath' hauto) and always the same; the many beautiful or equal things we see "share in" them and are named after them (Ph. 102b). The Phaedo uses the Forms in three arguments: recollection, affinity, and the final argument. **Watch:** the Crito says nothing about Forms, and in the Phaedo they arrive as realities Socrates says he is always talking about (Ph. 76d, 100b), as if already familiar.

Hypothesis (method of). The procedure Socrates adopts after giving up natural science (Ph. 100a, 101d-e). Lay down the account that seems strongest, accept what agrees with it and reject what does not; if the hypothesis itself is challenged, first check whether its consequences agree with one another, and then defend it from a higher hypothesis until you reach something adequate. Do not mix discussion of the starting point with discussion of its consequences, as the contradiction-mongers do. Socrates' parting advice that the "first hypotheses" need more examination (Ph. 107b) applies the method to his own proof.

Justice (dikaiosune, to dikaion). Both dialogues rest on it. In the Crito the only question allowed is whether escape would be just (Cr. 48b-d), and justice is what health is to the body: that part of us improved by just action and ruined by unjust (Cr. 47d-48a).

Laws' speech. The centerpiece of the Crito (Cr. 50a-54d). Socrates imagines the Laws and the city confronting him at the door. Their claims: escape would destroy them, since a city cannot survive if private persons cancel court verdicts (Cr. 50a-b); they gave him birth, upbringing and education, so he stands to them as a child or servant, not an equal entitled to strike back (Cr. 50d-51c); and by staying seventy years when free to leave, he agreed to obey them or persuade them (Cr. 51d-52e). They end by saying he was wronged "not by us, the laws, but by men" (Cr. 54c). **Watch:** it is debated whether Socrates endorses every claim the Laws make, or whether the speech is the kind of rhetoric he says an orator would give (Cr. 50b).

Mind (nous). Intelligence, as a principle that orders the world. Anaxagoras said Mind arranges everything; Socrates hoped this meant everything is arranged for the best and that each thing could be explained by showing why its arrangement is best (Ph. 97b-98b). **Watch:** nous here is cosmic reason, not the individual's mind.

Misology (misologia). Hatred of argument, which Socrates calls the worst thing that can happen to a person (Ph. 89c-91c). It arises like misanthropy: someone without skill trusts an argument, finds it false, does so again, and ends up blaming argument itself rather than his own lack of skill, believing that nothing is sound and everything "fluctuates up and down" as if in the Euripus (Ph. 90c). The cure is to suppose that it is we who are not yet sound (Ph. 90e).

Natural science. The inquiry into nature (peri phuseos historia) of the early Greek thinkers: what living things are made of, whether we think with blood, air or fire, how the heavens move. Socrates says he was keen on it when young, but found it left him unable to say even why one plus one makes two, and gave it up (Ph. 96a-97b).

Never do wrong in return. The premise Socrates says few people share and that divides those who hold it from those who do not (Cr. 49c-d): one must never do wrong, and so never return wrong for wrong or harm for harm, whatever one has suffered. It rejects the common Greek view that justice means helping friends and harming enemies, and it is the hinge of the Crito.

Opinion of the many versus the expert. An athlete heeds his trainer, not the crowd; likewise on just and unjust we should heed the one who knows, "and the truth itself," not the majority (Cr. 47a-48a). Crito's answer, that the many can kill you, is granted and set aside: what matters is not living but living well (Cr. 48b).

Opposites. Pairs such as large and small, hot and cold, odd and even, living and dead. **Watch:** the word does two jobs. The cyclical argument says opposite *things* come from each other; the final argument says opposite *qualities* never become each other. An unnamed listener spots the apparent contradiction (Ph. 103a), and Socrates' reply (Ph. 103b-c) is worth reading slowly.

Participation (methexis, "sharing in"). The relation between a thing and the Form it is named after: a beautiful thing is beautiful because it shares in the Beautiful (Ph. 100c-d). Socrates says he will not insist on whether to call it presence, sharing or something else.

Philosophy (philosophia). Literally love of wisdom. In the Phaedo it is a whole way of life: training to keep the soul apart from the body's pleasures and opinions so as to see the truth (Ph. 64a-69e, 82c-84b). **Watch:** the word means more than an academic subject; Evenus counts as a philosopher (Ph. 61c), and the "true philosophers" are a smaller group still.

Popular virtue. Moderation and justice acquired by habit and practice "without philosophy or understanding" (Ph. 82a-b). Its possessors earn the gentlest reincarnation, as bees, wasps, ants or decent humans.

Practice for dying (melete thanatou). The claim that those who practise philosophy rightly are rehearsing for death, since they spend their lives separating soul from body as far as possible (Ph. 64a, 67e, 80e-81a). It is the core of the defense: it would be absurd for them to resent the thing they have trained for.

Prisoner of desire. The soul's captivity in the body is worst because it is the work of the soul's own desires: "the prisoner himself" helps keep himself locked up (Ph. 82e). Each pleasure or pain is "another nail" fixing soul to body (Ph. 83d).

Purification (katharsis). Cleansing, in the ritual sense. The Phaedo redefines it as separating the soul from the body and collecting it into itself (Ph. 67c-d), and calls wisdom itself a purification (Ph. 69b-c). The purified soul goes to the gods; the impure one is dragged back toward the visible world (Ph. 81a-d).

Recollection (anamnesis). The doctrine that learning is recollecting knowledge the soul had before birth (Ph. 72e-77a). Something seen can remind us of something else, alike or unlike, as a lyre reminds a lover of the boy who plays it (Ph. 73d). When we see equal sticks and judge them to fall short of the Equal itself, we must already have known that standard, and since we have used our senses since birth we must have known it before birth (Ph. 74a-75c). So the soul existed before the body, and had intelligence. The argument refers back to the Meno's demonstration with a diagram (Ph. 73a-b). Simmias makes the dependence explicit: if the Forms exist, so did our souls; if not, the argument fails (Ph. 76d-77a).

Reincarnation. Souls return to new bodies suited to the lives they led: the gluttonous as donkeys, the violent as wolves and hawks, the conventionally decent as bees or ants or moderate humans; only the purified philosopher joins the gods (Ph. 81e-82c). The myth repeats the scheme in other terms (Ph. 113a, 113d-114c).

Safe answer. Socrates' deliberately simple explanation: beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful, large things large by Largeness, two things two by sharing in Twoness (Ph. 100d-101c). It avoids the puzzles of saying one man is taller "by a head," when a head is small. A "more sophisticated" safe answer later names the carrier of a Form: fire rather than heat makes a body hot, fever rather than sickness makes it sick, soul makes it alive (Ph. 105b-c).

Second sailing (deuteros plous). A sailors' phrase for taking to the oars when the wind fails, which Grube renders "as a second best" (Ph. 99c-d). Unable to find or learn the explanation by the good that he hoped for from Anaxagoras, Socrates turns to examining things through accounts and arguments (logoi), like a viewer who watches an eclipse in a reflection (Ph. 99d-100a). **Watch:** he immediately denies the method deals any more in images than looking at facts does; how modest "second best" is meant to be is an open question.

Social contract (agreement with the Laws). The Laws argue that a citizen who, as an adult, has seen how the city is run and chosen to stay has agreed by his conduct to obey or else persuade (Cr. 51d-52d). The agreement was made without compulsion or deceit and with seventy years to reconsider (Cr. 52e). Its force rests on an earlier step: one must keep just agreements (Cr. 49e). **Watch:** this is an agreement between a citizen and the laws, not among citizens, and it is implicit, not spoken.

"Persuade or obey." The Laws say they do not command harshly but offer a choice: persuade us we are wrong, or do what we say (Cr. 51b-c, 52a). Readers argue about how much room "persuade" leaves for disobedience.

Soul (psyche). That which makes a body alive (Ph. 105c-d), and also the seat of thought, character and virtue, the part of us concerned with justice and injustice in the Crito (Cr. 47e-48a). **Watch:** psyche joins two things English separates, the life-principle and the mind or self; arguments that move between them, as the final argument does, rely on the join.

Suicide prohibition. We may not kill ourselves, though death may be better for us, because we belong to the gods and are posted on guard, or held in a kind of prison, until a god sends a necessity such as Socrates' sentence (Ph. 61c-62c). Cebes turns it back: if the gods are good masters, why would the wise want to leave them? (Ph. 62c-e).

"The good life." The principle in the Crito that the most important thing is not living but living well, and that living well, beautifully and justly are the same (Cr. 48b).

True virtue and slavish virtue. Virtue built on trading one pleasure or fear for another, "like coins," is a mere appearance of virtue fit for slaves; the only true currency is wisdom (phronesis), with which real courage, moderation and justice come (Ph. 69a-b).

Weaver objection. Cebes' objection (Ph. 86e-88b). Granting that the soul outlasts the body, even many

bodies, does not show it lasts forever: an old weaver outlives many cloaks but dies before his last one. The soul might wear out after many lives, and no one could know which death would be its last. It is the objection the final argument is built to meet (restated at Ph. 95b-e).

"What it is" (ho esti). The phrase Socrates uses for the Forms, the things "we mark with the seal of 'what it is'" in question and answer (Ph. 75d, 92d): what each thing essentially is, as opposed to the things that merely have the quality.

E. The myth

Acheron and the Acherusian lake. The river flowing opposite Oceanus, through desolate regions, into the lake where most souls arrive after death, stay for an appointed time, and are purified or rewarded before being sent back to be born (Ph. 112e-113a, 113d-e).

Cocytus and the Styx. The fourth river, called Stygion, enters a wild blue-gray region and forms the lake Styx, then runs into Tartarus opposite the Pyriphlegethon; the poets call it Cocytus (Ph. 113b-c). Those guilty of a curable killing are cast out of Tartarus by way of Cocytus (Ph. 114a).

Ether. The pure upper air in which the stars are set; water, mist and the air we breathe are its sediment, collected in the hollows (Ph. 109b-c, 111b).

Guardian spirit (daimon). The spirit allotted to each person in life, which leads the soul after death to judgment (Ph. 107d-e, 113d). The road has many forks, so guides are needed, contrary to the single path of Aeschylus' lost Telephus (Ph. 108a).

Hollows of the earth. We live not on the surface of the earth but in one of many hollows, around the Mediterranean "like ants or frogs around a swamp," between Phasis (the eastern end of the Black Sea) and the Pillars of Heracles (Gibraltar) (Ph. 109a-b). Like a creature on the sea floor who takes the water for the sky, we take the air for the heavens (Ph. 109c-e).

Judgment and the incurable. After death souls are judged. The ordinary go to the Acherusian lake; those guilty of great sacrilege or murder are judged incurable and thrown into Tartarus forever; those whose great crimes were curable are cast out after a year, and their punishment ends only when their victims forgive them (Ph. 113d-114b); the very pious rise to live on the true earth, and those purified by philosophy live thereafter without bodies (Ph. 114b-c).

Noble risk and incantation. Socrates declines to insist that the story is true in its details, but says it is fitting and a "noble" risk to believe that it, or something like it, is true about our souls, and to repeat it to oneself like a charm (Ph. 114d). The idea of singing a charm over the frightened child within each of us first comes up at Ph. 77e-78a.

Oceanus. The largest of the four rivers, flowing in a circle around the outside (Ph. 112e).

Pyriphlegethon. "Fiery-blazing," the third river, which passes through a region burning with fire, forms a boiling lake of water and mud, and feeds volcanic lava streams such as those of Sicily (Ph. 111e, 113a-b). Those who struck a parent in anger are carried out of Tartarus along it (Ph. 114a).

Sphere in the middle. Socrates' first conviction about the earth: it is a sphere in the middle of the heavens, held in place not by air or any support but by its own balance and the uniformity of what surrounds it (Ph. 108e-109a). It answers the vortex and the lid-of-air theories he mocked at Ph. 99b.

Tartarus. The great chasm that pierces right through the earth, Homer's deepest pit (Ph. 111e-112a). All rivers flow into and out of it, and their surge, like breath going in and out, drives the winds and waters of the world (Ph. 112a-e). It is also the place of punishment for the worst souls (Ph. 113e).

True earth. The real surface of the earth, above the air in the pure ether. Seen from above it looks like a twelve-patched leather ball of brilliant colors; its stones are what our gems are fragments of; its people live longer, see the heavenly bodies as they truly are, and meet the gods face to face (Ph. 110b-111c). The very pious go to live there (Ph. 114c).